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ROBERT H. BABCOCK
T h e  R ise  a nd  F a ll  o f  P o r t l a n d ’s W a t e r f r o n t
1850-1920
On a cold, dark night in December, 1853, a group of 
businessmen sat down to a sum ptuous meal at Lancaster 
Hall in Pordand, Maine. They had gathered to celebrate 
the arrival of an English cargo-carrying steamship, the 
Sarah Sands, in the city’s harbor. T he officers o f H er 
Majesty's vessel, resplendent in the uniform s of the world’s 
greatest maritime power, drank toasts to the assemblage. 
Swinging gracefully at its m ooring, the Sarah Sands 
provoked a wave of excited talk in Portland, for it was not 
just a chance visitor. It had been sent by its English owners 
to inaugurate regular steamship service between Portland 
and  L iverpool, a B ritish  city co n s id ered  by m ost 
nineteenth-century businessmen to be the commercial and 
industrial capital of the world. Public displays o f joyous 
optimism at that d inner sharply contrasted with the 
feelings of gloom shared by Portlanders a few years earlier 
when their town had been called a "deserted village.”1
T he celebration in late 1853 m arked the completion o f a 
plan of economic growth launched in the late 1840s and 
based upon P o rtlan d ’s com m odious harbo r and its 
geographical proximity to N orth Atlantic trade routes. 
T he plan was the brainchild of a native of Maine known 
far and wide for his fountain of words, his inexhaustible 
energv, and his fearsome tem per. John  Alfred Poor, a 
lawyer then in his forties, had conceived it, prom oted it in 
a score of pam phlets, helped raise the money for it, and 
guided its implem entation. While still a youth Poor had 
caught sight of one of America’s first locomotives during  a 
visit to Boston. Nearly overwhelmed by this marvel, his
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active mind and fertile imagination soared into a new 
orbit.2 Annually the St. Lawrence River fro/.e over, and lie- 
saw no reason why Maine’s largest <ily should not become 
the winter port of Canada during those months when 
Montreal was locked in ice. When in 1H45 the United 
States Congress decided to permit goods destined lot 
British North America to pass through this country I ree ol 
duty, Poor and a small group set out to build a railway
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between Portland and M ontreal. A fter an incredible 
m id-winter journey in a blinding snowstorm through the 
White M ountains, Poor arrived in Montreal ju st ahead of 
Boston m erchants intent upon garnering this trade for 
their own city. M ontreal businessmen were persuaded by 
Poor to build a rail line to the United States border, while 
Portlanders constructed the American portion of what was 
soon called the St. Lawrence and Atlantic Railroad. To 
provide locomotives and rolling stock, Poor founded the 
Portland Company. After surm ounting a succession of 
obstacles the first engine traveled over these rails in 1853.3 
Fortunately for Portland’s nearly bankrupted prom oters, 
the line was immediately incorporated into British N orth 
America’s chief transportation system, the Grand T runk  
Railway (g t r ). T hus by  the end of 1853 Portlanders saw 
much to cheer them. T heir city had been linked by ribbons 
of steel to the fertile and prosperous Great Lakes region of 
N orth America. Mechanics at the Portland Company were 
turn ing  out scores of locomotives. A newly organized 
Board of T rade began to prom ote Portland’s commercial 
and  in d u s tr ia l p o ten tia l based u p o n  “ the n a tu ra l 
advantages o f the po rt.” Commercial Street was laid out at 
Poor’s direction and a marginal railway built linking the 
w aterfront to the new railway. H arbor commissioners 
were appointed to supervise the construction of wharves. 
A new reciprocal trade treaty between British N orth 
America and the United States appeared to make “the 
commercial interests o f Canada and Maine identical.”4
T he w aterfront seemed pivotal to all those who thought 
about Portland’s fu ture in those days. T he port was a 
half-day closer to Liverpool than Boston and possessed a 
full day’s advantage over New York City. Its nearly nine 
miles of ocean frontage, its relatively deep entrance, its 
ease o f access in tides, and its shelter from storms gave the 
city an enviable resource, and now the G rand T runk  
Railway prom ised to bring the vast wealth of the North
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American continent to the intersection of Fore and India 
streets. “The future of Portland,” Poor wrote, “depends 
upon its ability to secure the bulk of [this] trade.”5 T hree 
years a lter the Sarah Sands weighed anchor, Portland’s city 
lathers gladly spent $60,000 to build two piers long 
enough to receive the Great Eastern, the largest steamship 
ever built at that time. Although the ship never docked at 
Portland, the waterfront rem ained central to the city’s 
growth over the next fifty years as far as most residents 
were concerned. During a single day in the early 1900s, 
P o rtlan d ers  som etim es coun ted  nearly  a score o f 
freighters docked along the city’s 2 million feet of 
privately-owned wharves, taking on or unloading freight, 
purchasing valuable supplies and services, and giving 
work to many hundreds of the city’s residents.6
But not today. Apart from the sum m er ferry to 
Yarmouth and an occasional tanker, virtually no ships call 
at Portland nowadays. What happened? Few historians are 
known to have looked into this question. T he standard 
answers are found in the prefaces to reports prom oting 
various schemes for Portland’s development. They suggest 
that the city’s waterfront commerce plumm eted when the 
governm ent of Canada decided to use Halifax and Saint 
Jo h n  ra th e r  than Portland  as w inter ports o f the 
Dominion. They imply that the m ajor decisions on 
Portland’s waterfront were made in Ottawa rather than in 
Portland, and Mainers had little to say about it.7
A false “common sense” often misleads people into 
believing that w hatever happened  in the past was 
inevitable, but historians are usually less willing than 
planners to accept that notion. One of the ways they assess 
the relative inevitability of a past occurence is by 
com paring it with other events in a similar circumstance. 
In o rder to better understand the evolution of Portland’s 
w aterfront this paper will com pare its history with that of 
Saint John , New Brunswick, one of Portland’s major rivals
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for C anada’s w inter port trade. T he two ports are 
eminently comparable for the period of 1850 to 1920; 
both had large, ice-free harbors close to N orth Atlantic 
shipping lanes. They contained approximately the same 
num ber of people in the m id-nineteenth century, and in 
the following decades they experienced similar patterns of 
economic g row th / In 1895 Saint John  began developing 
its harbor facilities and challenged Portland’s monopoly as 
a w inter port of Canada. By the 1920s it had em erged with 
the lion’s share of this business. A comparison of decisions 
by m erchants and civic elites in Portland and Saint John 
ought to shed some light on the reasons for the decline of 
port activities in Portland and the extent to which this 
falloff was a result of local decisions or external forces.
The views of merchants in both cities are readily 
obtained from the records of their respective boards of 
trade.9 They show that Portland’s civic and business 
leaders actually neglected their harbor at a critical m om ent 
during the first decades of this century when Saint John 
merchants challenged Portland’s control over the winter 
port trade. Instead of modernizing Portland’s waterfront, 
merchants linked their citv’s future to tourism, retailing, 
and m anufacturing. Unlike people residing in other 
Canadian or American port cities, Portlanders failed to 
invest any public funds in their harbor facilities until they 
were required to do so bv Congress in 1917. By that time 
their response was too little and too late. On the other 
hand, Saint John  business leaders had obtained funds 
from their City Hall and from Ottawa to build wharves, 
warehouses, breakwaters, and a dry dock in the crucial 
years around the First World War. As a result, Saint John's 
bustling, m odern, and prosperous harbor is the third 
largest port in Canada today, while Portland's w aterfront 
continues to decav. The weight of historical evidence 
suggests that these contrasting outcomes were not merelv
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the consequence of forces beyond either city’s boundaries, 
but also resulted from decisions made by Portland and 
Saint Jo h n  civic and business elites at the turn  of the 
century.
Long after John  Poor’s death in 1871, Portlanders 
rem ained captivated by his vision. T he city used its credit 
to carry out his plans, and trade boomed following the 
completion of the G rand T runk  system, which stretched 
from  Portland to Chicago. The city’s first grain elevator, 
capable of holding 175,000 bushels, was constructed with 
local bank funds in 1875. Two steamship lines subsidized 
by the Canadian governm ent provided fortnightly service 
from  Portland to Liverpool during the winter months. 
Exports to Europe consisted primarily of western grain 
and Maine apples, whereas sugar, molasses, and coal 
dom inated the list of imports. But there were problems as 
well, and even those Portlanders especially prone to flights 
of fancy began to wonder if their city would ever surpass 
Boston. T he recurring absence of sufficient inbound cargo 
made it less economical for steamers to stop at Portland 
than at more diversified ports on the American east coast 
despite the Maine city’s greater proximity to Europe. The 
g t r  also found it hard to persuade ships to call at Portland 
because of its inadequate terminal facilities, and the dollar 
value o f both exports and imports d ropped substantially 
during  the 1880s. For instance, only one steamer a week 
could be loaded at the grain elevator. Portland merchants 
appointed a committee to confer with the Grand T runk , 
but they apparently did not take the problem to city 
officials.10
W hen the Dominion’s first transcontinental railway, the 
Canadian Pacific (c p r ), neared completion in the 1880s, 
Portland m erchants tried to make their city its eastern 
term inus, anticipating that it would “soon drop into our 
lap . .not only the rich territory that it traverses from  the 
Pacific to the Atlantic, but a trade of untold wealth from
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the Pacific isles and Japan and China.” If the c p r  joined 
the g t r  on Commercial Street, the Board of T rade 
concluded, “there will be no need then to coax great ocean 
steamships to come to this port.” Portland m erchants and 
civic elites obviously still accepted Poor's dictum that the 
w aterfront was central to the city’s prosperity.11
N everthe less p o r t ex p an sio n  lagged b eh in d  
expectations throughout the rem ainder o f the nineteenth 
century, and m erchants debated what they could do to 
im prove the situation . Som e concluded th a t m ore 
w aterfront storage capacity was needed; others spoke of 
the need for public investment. At a Board o f T rade 
banquet in 1889, Mayor Charles T. Chapm an suggested 
that steamship lines be granted a subsidy to stop at 
Portland. If  they did this, he declared, “all the ..  .elevator
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and w harf facilities will be forthcoming, for W estern 
grains and products will come here naturally seeking 
trans-sh ipm ent ab road .”12 But Portlanders appeared  
unwilling themselves to offer an inducem ent to the 
s team sh ip  com pan ies, an d  th e  m ayor s assertio n s 
rem ained untested. City business reports expressed even 
more gloom after the advent o f a worldwide depression in 
1893. Only sixteen steamers were booked for Portland 
during  the 1896 winter season, less than half the num ber 
that had called at the city in 1887. T he Portland Com pany 
ordered  a 60 percent reduction in its shop crews and cut 
the wages o f those rem aining by 10 percent.13
T he argum ents trum peting Portland’s advantages over 
Boston and New York could be used equally well by Saint 
John  civic and business leaders com peting for the lucrative 
N orth Atlantic trade. Its spacious harbor was even closer 
to Liverpool than Portland’s, and after 1876 it was also 
linked by rail to M ontreal by way of the Intercolonial 
Railway (i c r ). Hopes that the ic r  would enable Saint 
Jo h n ’s factories to sell wares throughout the continent 
failed to materialize, however, and by the 1880s civic elites 
d e sp e ra te ly  so u g h t som e an tid o te  fo r th e  city ’s 
s ta g n a tio n .14 At th is p o in t S ain t J o h n ’s e lec ted  
representatives in Parliam ent used their votes to insure 
that the Canadian Pacific would term inate at Saint John  
ra ther than at Portland. T hus the 482-mile “Short Line’7 
was constructed across northern  Maine in the late 1880s 
helping Saint Jo h n  to even the scorecard. Being only 243 
miles away, Portland was still closer than Saint John  to 
M ontreal, o f course, but the New Brunswick port had 
im proved its position significantly regard ing  fre igh t 
charges.15
Saint Jo h n  leaders relied upon  several favorable 
external circumstances helping them to boost the city’s 
w a te rfro n t business. T h e  last two decades o f  the
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nineteenth century witnessed England’s expansion to the 
far reaches of the globe. Queen Victoria reigned over an 
em pire that inspired millions of her subjects, and they 
gave her name to an era. None were more loyal than the 
mass of English-speaking Canadians. They gloried in 
Britain’s exploits and looked forward to the day when all 
parts o f the em pire would be federated into a worldwide 
Anglo-Saxon union. As Carl Berger has observed, at this 
time British imperialism was a potent form of Canadian 
nationalism. In an international atm osphere of exorbitant 
flag-waving and sabre-rattling, the Union Jack fluttered 
from the tall masts of fast, new British liners crisscrossing 
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Like government-owned 
airlines in many countries today, fast steamships at the 
turn  o f the century com manded prestige that was believed 
to enhance national reputations as well as to open 
profitable new trade channels.16
U n fo rtu n a te ly  for C anadians, B rita in ’s fast new 
steamers docked at New York City rather than at Halifax 
or Saint John  during  the winter months when the St. 
Lawrence was frozen, provoking both governm ent and 
business leaders in Canada to talk of starting a “Fast 
Atlantic Service” between Liverpool and Canadian ports. 
These ships were expected to follow projected “All-Red” 
routes that linked the various parts o f the British Empire 
by steam ship , railway, and  cable connections and  
promised to make the Imperial ideal become a reality for 
British subjects scattered across the globe. It was endorsed 
by growing num bers o f British officials who feared the 
Germ an kaiser’s expansionist designs and sought some 
means of girding the em pire’s defenses. Only governm ent 
assistance, they realized, could persuade hard-nosed 
steamship m anagers to abandon the m ore profitable 
Liverpool-New York route. T he Canadian governm ent 
already provided an annual mail subsidy, and  the
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anticipated benefits in prestige, trade, and immigration 
from  a Fast Atlantic Service whetted the appetites o f both 
businessmen and politicians in the Maritime provinces. By 
the 1890s, then, considerable support had surfaced in 
Canada and Britain for a subsidized steamship service.17
But who would pay for the subsidy? And which cities 
would be favored? A fter several years o f jockeying 
between the British and Canadian governments, and also 
between the Maritime provinces and Ottawa, a num ber of 
deals were finally concluded. Both Saint John  and Halifax 
jo ined Portland as winter ports, with the New Brunswick 
city relying upon its new c p r  connection to M ontreal and 
H alifax  using  the  g o v ern m en t-o w n ed  i c r  ro u te . 
H enceforth only the two Canadian ports would receive 
subsidized mail ships. Portland, of course, continued to 
depend upon the G rand T runk  Railway to tap its share of 
the continent’s resources. A joint British-Canadian subsidy 
of $350,000 for a Fast Atlantic Service was approved, but 
that deal fell th rough .18
All was not lost for Saint John, however, because the 
governm ent had been responding in part to the dem ands 
of Saint John  m erchants and civic officials under the 
leadersh ip  o f W. Frank Hatheway, a ta len ted  and 
resourceful tea m erchant who was president of the city’s 
Board o f Trade. For months Hatheway had lobbied for a 
Fast A tlantic Service in the halls o f the C anadian 
Parliament. He went to England and prom oted the idea 
am ong m erchants in M anchester and other British cities. 
He obtained letters of endorsem ent from the boards of 
trade in Quebec City, Toronto, and W innipeg. Despite the 
governm ent’s hesitancy Hatheway continued talking to the 
steamship companies, and he finally persuaded one of 
them to make a definite offer. In late 1895 Ottawa finally 
agreed to subsidize a slower and cheaper winter service 
between Saint John  and Liverpool by the Beaver Line for
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$25,000. While this was not as grandiose as a Fast Atlantic 
Service, it was sufficient for Saint John  civic and business 
leaders to pat themselves on the back. T he Board of 
T rad e’s annual report left little doubt about the Canadian 
winter port’s decidedly political origins.19
Yet the struggle was not over, because Ottawa’s subsidies 
were only granted on a yearly basis. To make their port 
m ore com petitive, the New Brunswickers strove to 
improve relations with the local longshorem en’s unions. 
They lobbied in Ottawa for the much more costly Fast 
Atlantic Service; they echoed the c p r ’s perennial dem and 
for more freight routed through Saint John; and they 
badgered the minister of public works about dredging the 
harbor. They entered negotiations for a dry dock to be 
financed by a consortium of imperial, federal, provincial, 
and city governments. On these occasions Saint John 
leaders touted a card that Portlanders could not play. 
Shortly after the c p r  Short Line had been completed, the 
city had borrowed money to build wharves, to erect a 
one-m illion  bushel g rain  e levator, and to finance 
dredging. After the Beaver Line contract had been signed, 
the city practically doubled its w harf and warehouse 
facilities at the c p r  terminal. By 1904 Saint John taxpayers 
had spent three-quarters of a million dollars on port 
improvem ent, and city fathers could reasonably claim to 
have made an extraordinary financial effort to create a 
m odern port facility.20 Local leaders used this card to 
prevent Ottawa from  canceling annual subsidies to 
steamship lines. For example, when the governm ent’s 
commitment wavered in 1900, Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier was told that Saint John residents were “amazed 
and incredulous” that Ottawa would cancel the subsidies 
after the city had made enormous financial sacrifices on a 
port “which they consider vital to their fu ture welfare.” 
Exports had risen from $3 million in 1895 to $11 million 
by 1900, they observed, and any weakening of support by
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Laurier would “stir up angry and regrettable agitation.” 
By then Ottawa was underw riting winter steamship service 
between Saint John  and Liverpool, Glasgow, Dublin, 
Belfast, and London.21
T hroughou t this crucial period of port development, 
the Canadian Pacific Railway, the Saint John  City Council, 
and the Board of T rade worked together to improve the 
port and prom ote its business. They circulated pamphlets 
throughout Canada and Britain touting Saint Jo h n ’s new 
w a te rf ro n t facilities. T hey  p e rsu a d e d  O ttaw a to 
underw rite regular steamship service between Saint John 
and the West Indies. They lobbied to become the eastern 
term inus o f yet ano th er Canadian transcontinen tal 
railway. These efforts seemed to be rewarded in 1906 
when the C anadian Pacific Railway finally won the 
long-discussed contract to provide fast steamship service 
between Canadian and British ports. Two sleek new 
twenty-knot ships, the Empress of Britain and the Empress of 
Ireland, regularly docked at Saint John during  the winter 
months after that year. So glamorous were they that even 
some Americans came to Canada just to sail to Europe on 
the Empresses.22
In the same year a royal commission appointed to study 
C anada’s fu ture transportation needs visited Saint John 
and blessed the local undertakings. T he commissioners 
noted the extent to which local officials had built up Saint 
Jo h n ’s port facilities and called upon Ottawa to take over 
the w aterfront, build additional wharves, and commence 
fu rther dredging and breakwater construction. Although 
the recom m endation to nationalize the port was not 
carried out at this time, the commissioners made clear that 
the city’s w inter po rt activities deserved continued 
governm ent assistance.23 By then Saint Jo h n ’s winter 
exports had climbed to $23 million as com pared to 
Portland’s $28 million in 1904. The harbor com m anded
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New Brunswick’s attention to such an extent that nearby 
mines began m arketing their coal under the “W inter Port” 
label. Clearly, Saint John had broken Portland’s monopoly 
on C anada’s winter port business.24
Saint J o h n ’s challenge to P ortland  was partia lly  
obscured by a trem endous increase in Canada’s foreign 
trade at the tu rn  of the century. From the mid-1890s to 
the  F irst W orld  W ar, C an ad ian s en jo y ed  an 
unprecedented economic boom. “I’ve been coming to 
Portland for over twenty years,” said one captain in the 
British steamer service, “and I never saw the like” of 
Portland’s w aterfront business.25 Freight sheds seemed 
ready to burst with merchandise, railway cars clogged 
G rand T runk  sidings, and timekeepers rushed around the 
g t r  wharves night and day, trying to keep track of crews 
of longshorem en. A record fifty-four steamers departed 
from Portland in 1897, and a thousand railway cars filled 
with grain could be counted in the freight yards at 
dockside. U nder the supervision of the g t r ’s dynamic new 
m anager, Charles M. Hays, the railway and its Portland 
wharves acquired a new lease on life. In 1896-97 a new 
grain elevator capable o f holding 1.25 million bushels of 
prairie wheat dom inated Portland’s w aterfront skyline and 
was jo ined by a second elevator a few years later. The 
Grand T runk  extended its wharves, laid new track, built 
new stockyards at East Deering, and placed new rolling 
stock in service. Sometimes three huge steamships docked 
at the same time at the Grand T runk  wharves. Everyone 
from harbor pilots to grocers, butchers, lumber dealers, 
hotel proprietors, and longshorem en benefited from the 
increased  port business. M erchants concluded that 
Portland would grow in size and importance “as a direct 
result of this enterprise of the Grand T ru n k ,” and they 
predicted year-round steamship service from Portland to 
English ports within a few years. They gladly entertained
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Hays at a banquet and concluded that he was “the right 
man in ju st the right place.”26
If good times might have obscured the need for 
c o o rd in a te d  public and  p riv a te  p la n n in g  and  
development, bad times provoked worry and an occasional 
reassessment. During the 1899/1900 winter season, six 
steamship lines dispatched a record total of ninety-three 
steamers from Portland to Liverpool, London, Glasgow, 
Bristol, Antwerp, and Hamburg. These ships spent an 
average o f $1.5 million for labor and stores.27 T he bulk of 
goods leaving Portland consisted of apples, cheese, flour, 
meats, canned goods, cattle, and sheep, while imports 
consisted mostly of bleaching powder and china clay used 
in the paper industry, and iron, sugar, salt, and coal. The 
dollar value of the port’s exports rose from $28.6 million 
in 1899 to $47.5 million in 1901, while imports climbed 
from $5.8 million to $9.3 million during the same period. 
At one point the British consul in Portland counted 
tw en ty -n in e  o cean -g o in g  steam ers in th e  h a rb o r , 
twenty-six of them  carrying British registry. T he figures in 
the table below chronicle the growth o f traffic and 
tonnage. But they also suggest that port business could 
take a sudden tu rn  for the worse. In fact, grain exports 
d ropped  over 50 percent during the winter of 1901/02. 
While exports exceeded $31 million in 1906, they fell 
during  the business recession o f 1907-1909. Im ports still 
lagged behind exports.28 Was Portland beginning to feel 
the com petition from Saint John  for Canada’s winter port 
business? A few Portlanders thought so and concluded 
that the city ought to take charge of its w aterfront. The 
Board of Trade Journal warned that “powerful influences” 
were working to divert Portland’s trade “to o ther ports 
showing greater local interest.”29 T he board appointed a 
special committee to form ulate a plan for the harbor in 
o rder to get Congress’s attention. But most city leaders 
rem ained content to let the Grand T runk  Railway make all
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the effort and shoulder all the expenses; no plan was 
forthcom ing and no city wharves or warehouses were 
built.30 Portlanders had shown more interest in the 1850s 
in accommodating the Great Eastern than in servicing the 
ships that regularly called at the tu rn  of the century.
Po r t l a n d ’s W in t e r  Po r t  Business 
1897/98-1901/02






so u rc e ; BTJ 15 (February 1903): 305.
W hen Portland businessmen and civic leaders did seek 
public assistance, they knocked on the doors of Congress 
rather than at City Hall. Since the 1830s the Army Corps 
o f Engineers had been overseeing the construction of 
breakwaters and dredging of the harbor and Back Bay. In 
1896 Congress agreed to expand this effort considerably 
by authorizing excavation of the harbor to a depth of 
thirty feet at low tide. By 1902 nearly 4 million cubic yards 
had been removed by the contractors, enabling the largest 
steamships to use Portland H arbor and smaller vessels to 
dock at Back Bay.31 T he Maine congressional delegation 
also ob ta ined  several navigational aids for h a rb o r 
approaches. W orking through the National Rivers and 
H arbors Congress, a lobbying agency, Board of T rade
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officials persuaded the governm ent to station a ship 
nearby to destroy derelict vessels, but failed to obtain a dry 
dock. In 1901 the board pressed for greater fortification 
of the harbor, a strategy which they expected would lead 
to the posting of many troops in the vicinity. Within two 
years, over $1 million had been spent by the W ar 
D epartm ent to construct or im prove Ft. Williams at 
Portland Head, Ft. McKinley on Great Diamond Island, 
Ft. Levett on Cushing’s Island, and Ft. Preble on the Cape 
Elizabeth shore. T he thousand-odd artillerymen assigned 
to these installations benefited the local economy; their 
batteries o f ten-inch and twelve-inch m ortars provided 
Portlanders with one of the most fortified harbors in the 
nation. No one was quite sure from whom Portlanders 
were being protected, but these new forts — along with a 
new lightship, a new $200,000 revenue cutter, and a new 
$40,000 im m igration quarantine station — testified to the 
political clout o f Thom as B. Reed, Nelson Dingley and 
other Mainers in Congress.32 Yet these piecemeal gifts 
failed to com pare with the coordinated program  of port 
expansion and developm ent that had been launched by 
private and public en terprise in Saint John . A few 
Portland m erchants, noting the absence of large, m odern, 
fireproof wharves in their harbor, concluded that such 
improvem ents were unlikely to be made until the city took 
over its w aterfront as o ther cities had done. But the 
majority of business and civic leaders tu rned  elsewhere for 
keys to Portland’s fu tu re .33
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, tourists 
began to pay regular sum m er visits to Maine. Steamers 
plying the waters between Boston, New York City, and 
Portland began to deposit thousands of visitors in hotels 
and cottages on the shores of Casco Bay and Cape 
Elizabeth. In 1888 th e Board of Trade Journal declared that 
Maine was becoming known “as the playground of the
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nation.” 4 By the turn  of the century this stream had 
grown into a torrent of 200,000 visitors who spent 
somewhere between $10 million and $50 million in this 
state. Portland officials began to look at their own city with 
a tourist’s eye.35 They criticized the "rubbish and weeds” 
on the walks along some city prom enades, o r the 
"unfinished appearance” of and “rowdy vandalism” in 
D eering Oaks Park. With unconscious hum or they 
complained of a “long-felt need” for public urinals in 
downtown Portland. They worried about the bad image 
created by newspaper stories detailing crime in city 
streets.36 T he Board of T rade helped inaugurate an 
annual Old Home Week to lure Maine natives back for a 
visit, organized trollev tours of Portland, and persuaded 
the school board to offer a summ er session for cottagers’ 
children. Portland merchants distributed a city shopping 
guide to all resorts within a fifty-mile radius and urged 
their fellow citizens to sustain Portland’s “good reputation 
for warm hospitality” in o rder to counter the attractions at 
Old O rchard Beach and Bar H arbor.37
The advent of tourist promotion in Maine coincided 
with the phenom enal growth of advertising media 
th ro u g h o u t the nation . As large businesses began 
com peting in national m arkets, they m anufactured  
brand-nam e goods that they sold directly to retailers 
rather than to wholesale houses. Advertising agencies soon 
sprang up to market these products and the technique 
spread to the m erchandizing of tourism  and other 
services.38 In 1903 the Board of Trade Journal published its 
first full-page advertisem ent “selling” Portland to tourists. 
Not surprisingly the blurb quoted extensively from 
Longfellow’s essay on Portland:
‘ . . .a city wherein the s tandard  oi intellectuality, ref inement,  morality, 
thrift,  enterpr ise ,  and  similar qualities, is exceptionally high.'
t o u r i s t s ! By all means stop at Portland, Maine, the Cleanest  and 
Healthiest  City in America . . . .:i9
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In 1906 Portland m erchants created a new standing 
committee on advertising at the Board of T rade, and 
raised $3,000 that year to market the city’s virtues as a 
tourist center. In subsequent years thousands of booklets 
p rom oted  the city’s hotel, d ining, and recreational 
facilities, also assured timid strangers that Portland was an 
“orderly city” and with “no objectionable elem ent” — that 
is, no “lawless” im m igrant class. Even the Board of Trade 
Journal changed its image, becoming a glossy magazine 
filled with large pictures and articles on such subjects as 
“ S ights in P o rtlan d  and  W here to See T h e m ,” 
“Maine — the Yachtsman’s Paradise,” “Hotel and Resort 
Notes,” and “With the Automobilists.”40
W hether because of advertising, the scenery, or the cool 
breezes, nearly every year subsequent to 1900 brought a 
larger num ber of tourists to Portland. Three-quarters 
arrived by rail at the city’s Union Station, and during 
August over a hundred  Pullman cars were counted every 
day. D irect train  service from  New York City was 
inaugurated. Not surprisingly, the flood o f tourists began 
to make an indelible impression on the Forest City. New 
hotels sprang up; new summ er playhouses, motion picture 
theatres, and bowling halls appeared. Even the annual 
maneuvers at Ft. Williams were now billed as a tourist 
attraction. A growing num ber o f affluent visitors arrived 
in new-fangled automobiles, and a few Portland hotels 
began catering especially to them. Auto repair and 
servicing centers opened . An estim ated 6,000 auto 
enthusiasts visited Portland in 1910, staying until October 
before heading to the nearby fall foliage in the interior. 
The Board of T rade launched a campaign to get city and 
state roads im p ro v ed , focusing  especially  on the 
Kittery-to-Portland “trunk line” which was in very poor 
condition. M erchants also noted the absence of up-to-date 
sign posts on Maine roads, a situation which undoubtedly
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gave birth to countless stories about Maine farm ers 
advising tourists how to get from “hea” ’ to “thea” ’ 41
T he new em phasis on tourism  could be seen on 
Commercial Street as well as on Congress Street. Graceful 
yachts, the ir sails billowing in the harbo r breezes, 
dom inated the w aterfront during the sum m er months. 
Warships from both the British and American fleets paid 
sum m er courtesy calls to Portland, fascinating both the 
natives and the tourists alike. In response to these guests 
the city in 1905 finally obtained ownership of a small piece 
of w aterfront property to construct a landing for both 
military and civilian sailors.42
Why did tourism rather than the winter port trade 
capture the imagination of Portland’s civic and business 
leaders? Tourist dollars seemed to be more evenly 
distributed throughout the business community. It was 
well nigh impossible, merchants declared, “to name a 
branch of trade that has not been directly or indirectly 
b enefited  by o u r ev e r-in c reas in g  su m m er to u ris t 
business,” which was believed to be worth a million dollars 
a year to Portland. While this am ount was only two-thirds 
of the estimated annual winter port benefits, tourism was 
thought to have a more positive effect on property 
values.43 Moreover, it was easier for civic leaders to 
quantify the beneficial effects of this wonderful new 
“industry,” and, consequently, they were able to generate 
more public support for it. Tourists beating a path to 
Board of T rade rooms on Exchange Street were avidly 
counted year after year. Portland’s trolleys transported 
one million more passengers in 1910 than five years 
before, and Casco Bay steamers carried 300,000 more 
people in 1910 than just a year earlier. Hotel managers 
and retailers frequently reported “rem arkable” increases 
in business, “We reap a benefit from these visitors,” they 
concluded, adding: “they gain in health and we in wealth.”
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M erchants also believed that tourist promotion efforts 
helped allay rural peoples’ suspicions of Portland city 
slickers. T hus P ortlanders enthusiastically endorsed  
efforts to prom ote tourism while leaving the winter port 
business in the care of G rand T runk  Railway officials.44
Tourism  also helped to lift the sights of Portland 
retailers beyond their city’s limits. As chambermaids and 
waitresses from Kittery to Bar H arbor began to adopt the 
styles of Maine’s more affluent sum m er visitors, merchants 
experienced a g reater dem and for fashionable and 
expensive goods.45 Setting out to win business that had 
formerly gone to Boston or even New York City, they 
decided to prom ote Portland as a retail distribution center 
for northern  New England and adjacent areas of Canada. 
In the spring of 1911 they chartered a special train to take 
them to Aroostook County, where they hoped to make 
new business acquaintances and, ‘‘incidentally,” exploit 
Portland “ as a live commercial city.”46 Boston might have 
larger stores, they boasted, but not better ones than 
Portland. They even journeyed beyond the state’s borders 
to New Ham pshire, Vermont, and Quebec City, and laid 
plans for a national tour. In the spring of 1915 the 
m erchants reorganized into a chamber of commerce and 
broadened their journal to reflect the commercial interests 
of the whole state. Each month a Maine city or town was 
celebrated in prose and photographs. Thanks to these 
efforts, Portland m erchants expected their city to become 
the crown jewel for the surrounding coronet of Maine 
municipalities, “each having its own separate interests, but 
Ending Portland a common center.”47
As part of the campaign to prom ote retail sales, 
merchants drum m ed up the convention business. In 1902 
nine different conventions were held in Portland, “leaving 
large sums of money and aiding greatly in advertising our 
city abroad .”48 T hat year the w c t u ’s national gathering
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brought 500 delegates, and in succeeding years such 
groups as the commercial travelers, the Maine State 
Pomological Society, the M aine Seed Im provem ent 
Association, and the Maine Dairymen’s Association also 
convened in Portland. The largest were the Maine State 
Grange, which usually attracted 3,000 visitors, and the 
state teachers’ association. In 1912 over 4,000 educators 
packed Portland’s brand-new city hall auditorium  which 
had been built specifically to lure these groups. W hen the 
new hall proved too small for increasingly popular 
automobile shows or music festivals, Portland m erchants 
launched a drive for an exposition building.49
In many ways, annual conventions, rural business trips, 
and tourism  shared an obvious common denom inator; 
they all produced the same w onderful jingle o f cash 
register bells. By luring rural Mainers and neighboring 
New Englanders or Canadians to Portland during the 
off-season, canny m erchants found a way to extend their 
tourist business beyond the dreaded Labor Day exodus. 
From their viewpoint funds spent on new street lighting, 
the new city hall and auditorium , and on the new 
exposition building — rather than on new wharves and 
warehouses — made Portland “a city of progressiveness 
and refinem ent, and [were] destined to bring much money 
and popularity to the Forest City.” Thus Portland was no 
longer merely the winter port of Canada but had become 
instead the “Metropolis of Maine,” “Queen City of the 
East,” “Gateway to the sum m er playground of America,” 
and the center of commercial enterprise in northern  New 
England.50
In addition to these promotions, some Portland civic 
and business leaders also wanted to make their city into a 
m anufacturing center. This was by no means a new idea, 
and we have noted how John  Poor and his friends 
fo u n d e d  the P o rtlan d  C om pany as p a r t o f  th e ir
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m id-nineteenth-century railway and port developm ent 
scheme. D uring the gloomy 1880s, many prom oted  
expanded m anufacturing activity as an antidote to the 
stagnant economy and exodus of Mainers. At that time the 
Board of T rade dem anded “fair play” — m eaning lower 
taxes — for m anufacturers. “If  the citizens of Portland 
would pu t money into business as readily and as freely as 
they do into am usem ents,” the Journal declared, “our city 
would very soon realize a substantial boom .”51
T he re tu rn  of prosperity at the tu rn  of the century 
resu lted  in a considerable expansion  o f P ortland 's  
m anufacturing base. While only a few large factories 
com peted in national markets, most other enterprises 
served the needs of northern  New England's booming 
pulp and paper, textile, and shoemaking towns. Even the 
Portland Company stopped making locomotives after 
1891 and began to turn out pulp digesters for the paper 
industry and steam engines and elevators for lum ber and 
textile mills. During the winter it enjoyed a good business 
repairing the engines of British steamers. As a result of 
these diversified activities, Portland displaced Lewiston as 
Maine's leading m anufacturing center.52
In 1909 the Board o f T rade decided to step up its 
prom otion o f m anufacturing, perhaps because its small 
businesses had proven “practically im m une” to the 
recession of 1907-1909. M erchants had also begun to fear 
a disproportionate growth of Portland's tourist-related 
businesses, and concluded that expanded m anufacturing 
activity would provide a more suitable tax base. They 
pointed to the absence of any special inducem ents for 
businessmen and found city officials guilty of making 
“practically no effo rt” to find new industries.53 “T he other 
day,” said one well-known Portland businessman, “I was 
asked in Boston to tell what Portland does, and I was 
asham ed to find I knew so little.” Hence, a com mittee of
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the Board o f T rade began to drum  for factories as it had 
been advertising for tourists. In 1910 it organized an 
exposition to display the products of some sixty different 
industries already in the city. T he industrial show was so 
successful that the board went on to raise funds for the 
27,000-square-foot exposition building m entioned earlier, 
which opened on the outskirts of the city in 1915. To be 
sure, not all Portlanders joined in this effort. While some 
looked on smoking chimneys as evidence o f prosperity, 
others merely regarded them  as eyesores.54
Over the decade from 1910 to 1920 advocates of 
factories in Portland pointed to some modest gains. The 
ladies’ ready-made clothing industry flourished, a cold 
storage plant was built on Commercial Street, a m odern 
shoe factory opened on Milk Street, and Burnham  & 
Morrill erected a large new plant on the site of a form er 
shipyard in East Deering. Several paper box companies 
sprang up to supply the retail trade. T he city boasted of 
350 factories employing 6,000 hands who produced $10 
million worth of goods. Yet Portland still rem ained 
primarily a commercial rather than a m anufacturing 
center. Its hinterland was rather constricted, and its 
relatively greater distance from the North American 
industrial heartland increased freight costs for Portland 
industries com peting with those in New York City, 
Pittsburgh, or Chicago. Low-cost housing for workers 
rem ained scarce. T he First World W ar provided some 
additional stimulus, and in 1917 Portland’s new Chamber 
of Commerce (whose charter gave it authority “to promote 
business industries and civic ideals’’) created the city’s first 
planned industrial park on fifty acres of land near the 
B Sc M p lan t. T h u s m an u fac tu rin g  jo ined  tourism , 
retailing, and convention business as the major elements in 
Portland’s new development strategy. Clearly, the harbor 
and winter port trade had lost favor, and the city’s
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w aterfront was no longer deem ed as vital to Portland’s 
fu ture as it had been during  John  Poor’s life.55
Some people fretted over the consequences of this 
reordering  of priorities. By the century’s second decade 
the harbor was so badly crowded that ships were often 
forced to anchor in the channel. Although the G rand 
T ru n k  rebuilt its Galt W harf, dredging failed to keep pace 
with the ever-larger steamships which sometimes could 
not take on a full cargo. Frustrated Corps of Engineers 
officials met with merchants “to ascertain [their] wishes 
and ideas’ regarding future port development, pointing 
to the absence of adequate wharves and warehouses for 
the new and bigger steamers. One m erchant urged the 
Board of T rade to throw its energies into building 
“wharves to better accommodate large ships,” but the 
group settled instead upon a petition to W ashington for a 
harbor survey.56 Later they schemed to put pressure on 
the engineers by inviting a congressional com mittee to 
inspect Portland’s w aterfront. This strategy boom eranged: 
the congressm en considered P ortland’s private dock 
facilities "many decades behind the times” and were 
am azed to find no publicly owned piers. T hey told 
m erchants that the city should build municipal docks “at 
any co st” if they w anted  th e ir  h a rb o r  to rem a in  
co m p etitiv e  w ith o th e r  p o rts . T h ey  im p lied  th a t 
city-owned docks would provide the “strongest argum ent” 
for additional federal aid.57 A few m erchants agreed, 
absolving the Corps o f Engineers of blame for the po rt’s 
inadequacies, and concluding that Portland had received 
the help of the federal governm ent “in a sp ir it . . .worse 
than indifferent.” It had left its harbor unregulated, 
unprotected, and undeveloped. They found the city’s 
“indifference to our greatest commercial interest” to be 
intolerable.
We have done absolutely nothing. The city has given more attention to 
our inspected ash-carts than it has to the harbor.
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In November of 1914, the Board of T rade appointed a 
special committee to petition the city to prepare a public 
dock area and called attention to the miles of undeveloped 
shoreline along the Eastern Promenade and in South 
Portland.58
Instead the city moved to regulate its harbor, and for an 
entirely different reason. Visiting tourists, irate over thefts 
from their yachts and fuming at residents who regularly 
dum ped their ashes into the harbor, made their grievances 
well known to local officials. The city bought a powerboat 
and assigned three men to guard the yachts day and night. 
T he patrols ended on Labor Day. “This harbor is 
d ese rv in g  of b e tte r  tre a tm e n t,” a few m erch an ts  
complained. O thers agreed, but there were not enough 
dissident voices to force civic action. No municipal docks 
or warehouses were built on Portland’s commercial 
waterfront. Many citizens seemed more interested in the 
ef forts of Robert E. Peary, the arctic explorer, to persuade 
the navy to build an air base on an island in Casco Bay.59
In 1917 the United States Congress resolved the whole 
issue. T he Corps o f Engineers had asked the federal 
legislature for a “substantial sum” to dredge the channel 
five feet deeper (to thirty-five feet) and remove three 
shoals. Just a few weeks after Woodrow Wilson asked 
Congress to declare war against Germany, a Maine senator 
attached this bill to an emergency war measure. It passed, 
of course, but unlike previous bills it dem anded some 
assurance from local officials that “adequate berthing 
space” would be provided for deep-draft steamships. In 
other words, the Congress would no longer obligate the 
Corps of Engineers to dig harbors deeper and deeper for 
naught. As a result, city elites appealed to the state 
legislature for assistance and a commission was appointed 
to investigate their request,60
In 1919 the commission filed a report endorsing the 
need  fo r publicly  ow ned p ie rs .61 B ut first the  
commissioners chronicled the extent to which Portland’s 
w ate rfro n t had d e te rio ra ted . Most o f the forty-six 
privately owned wharves were constructed on pilings. Few 
of these old docks were found to be adequate, “and the 
buildings on many of them seem to be relics of by-gone 
days.” Only the Grand T runk  maintained four m odern 
piers, and even these were “not the latest” in design.62 
Elsewhere most of the successful seaports were publicly 
owned or controlled, the commissioners reported, “but 
neither the State of Maine nor the City of Portland has 
expended one cent to improve the port facilities of 
Portland H arbor.” Meanwhile Portland’s rivals — Boston, 
Montreal, and Saint John — had already spent millions on 
harbor improvem ents. Smaller harbors like Portland 
needed up-to-date facilities to offset the advantages of 
larger ports.
If business is once diver ted to o ther  ports with better  facilities, [it] may 
be lost to Portland tor  all t ime.K:*
Private enterprise should not be expected to make these 
improvements, they argued, because the indirect return  
would accrue to the city and state but not to a company. 
These argum ents persuaded both the legislature and the 
voters o f Maine to float a $2 million bond issue for the 
construction of a dock adjacent to the Grand T runk  
wharves. In 1922 the new $1,665,000 Maine State Pier 
opened for business. T he city (which had purchased the 
site for the pier) and the state had taken the first tardy step 
tow ard the m odernization of P ortland’s w aterfront. 
Would it be too late?
As the Maine commissioners had observed, Saint John  
already had begun upgrading its port facilities.64 At the 
request o f local officials, the Canadian governm ent in 
1911 began to develop the harbor on the east side of the
89
city. Parliam ent appropriated  $500,000 to begin work on a 
breakwater, dredging, wharves, and a dry dock, and later 
the governm ent awarded an $8.9 million contract to 
co m p le te  it. U n d e r  te rm s o f  the  a g re e m e n t the  
governm ent took possession of the breakw ater and 
wharves while the private contractor retained control of 
the dry dock. W ork started in 1912, but two-and-one-half 
years later about all that could be cited was a partially 
com pleted breakwater and 2.8 million cubic yards of 
dredging. T he outbreak of the First World W ar cut off the 
company from  English money markets and all work 
ceased in November o f 1916. Nevertheless, toward the 
end of the war another contract was granted to a different 
concern to complete all the port facilities except the 
wharves. T he new installation, including the dry dock, 
opened in 1923. When these facilities were added to those 
already in place on the west side o f Saint John, it comes as 
no surprise to learn that Saint Jo h n ’s port activities 
continued to flourish in the 1920s, while Portland’s went 
into a gradual decline.65
T he rise of Saint Jo h n ’s w aterfront and the fall of 
Portland’s occurred partly from external influences which 
Canadian officials could exploit if not fully control. Saint 
John  elites took advantage of a virulent English-Canadian 
se n tim e n t id en tify in g  th e  C an ad ian  n a tio n  with 
strengthened ties to Great Britain. Later, a growing 
Canadian nationalism occasioned by the country’s wartime 
achievem ents reinforced Saint Jo h n ’s claim to be a 
“National Port.’’ Furtherm ore, Saint Jo h n ’s city fathers 
adroitly used their political clout in Ottawa. A succession 
of cabinet ministers from the city voiced Saint Jo h n ’s 
ambitions at the highest levels o f governm ent and various 
forms o f assistance — ship subsidies, money for wharves, 
dredging, grain elevators, conveyors, and breakwaters — 
were steadily forthcoming. Finally, when the Canadian 
governm ent was forced to bail out the Grand T runk
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Railway after the First World War, it became quite clear to 
Ottawa officials (if not to Portland m erchants) that 
henceforth Saint John  rather than Portland would serve 
the bulk o f C anada’s winter port needs.
But it is a mistake to assume that the demise of 
Portland’s w aterfront was therefore inevitable. In the 
m id-nineteenth century, John  A. Poor had combined 
public with private capital to launch an am bitious 
developm ent plan based upon geography and the new 
railway technology. Railways and steamships transform ed 
the harbor into a functioning if not always flourishing 
winter port. Enthusiastic merchants and civic leaders built 
the Great Eastern wharves and financed the Grand T runk  
Railway’s first grain elevator. At the turn  o f the century, 
however, they began to prom ote other avenues to growth 
and prosperity, and left w aterfront activity in the hands of 
the financially troubled g t r . They considered tourism, 
retailing, conventioneering, and m anufacturing to be 
more worthy o f emphasis, while their counterparts in 
Saint Jo h n  launched a concerted effo rt to cap ture 
Portland’s winter port trade. The Canadians poured an 
impressive mix of public and private enterprise into 
dredging, wharves, warehouses, grain elevators, and a dry 
dock. Portland  elites also won considerable public 
assistance, but most of it was directed into dredging or 
military fortifications rather than into m odern berthing 
facilities. Unlike most other port cities, Portland refused to 
spend public funds on its waterfront. T he consequences of 
these contrasting  patterns o f local decision-m aking 
became more fully apparent after the First World War 
when C anada’s economic boom began to subside. By then 
Saint John  possessed a m odern ocean terminal, while the 
most up-to-date docks in Portland had already become 
Canadian governm ent property when the Grand T runk  
Railway fell into insolvency. For all these reasons the 
Maine State Pier opened too late to affect the outcome.
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Both cities had relied upon a m ixture of public and private 
investment, it should be noted, but it was the nature and 
timing of public aid rather than the total am ounts that 
spelled the difference in outcomes. Furtherm ore, public 
and private capital in Saint John  were coordinated and 
integrated; in Portland they were diffused and scattered.
What light this episode sheds on curren t discussions 
about the city’s w aterfront is left for the reader to decide. 
George Santayana once said that those who fail to learn 
the lessons of history are condem ned to repeat them. He 
failed to note that the so-called lessons are usually 
am biguous, and d iffe ren t historians often  arrive at 
conflicting interpretations of complex events. Nonetheless 
we tu rn  to the past for guidance because we have nowhere 
else to tu rn . I f  it is tru e  th a t P o rtla n d e rs  have 
com m issioned  tw en ty -th ree  d if fe re n t w a te rfro n t 
developm ent plans in the past fifteen years, as Portland 
City M anager T im  H oney told a Bangor audience 
recently, then perhaps it is time for them to look at the 
history o f their shoreline for a sense of direction.66 T here is 
no better place for city officials to begin than at the library 
of the Maine Historical Society, am ong the papers o f that 
forgotten friend of Portland’s harbor, John Alfred Poor.
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